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RODNEY CAR! ER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR HEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Whether this court erred ii i concluding that tl le search 
of appe linn! pursuant ti \n - consents won. invalid where he had 
been unreasonably seized by police officers and the consents were 
not sufficiently attenuated 1o purge thp prior police irisconduct. 
CONST J TUT lONAIi PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 35, Rules of the Utal I Court of Appeals: 
Order by the Co urt fo r a Respons e t o A | J pe1 Ie e"s 
Pet i t i on f i, r' Rehea r i nq . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appel: * Rodney farter, wa:-, charged with pos^e* c ion 
of a contr o] 1 . ance with intent to distribut e# a second 
degree felony, i i I violation ot lit din (ode Annotated §5B 37-
8(1) (a) (iv) (1930) (R. oj. Appellant f ' ed i rtu»]i 1- supj ess 
the evidence seized from him after a warrantless search of his 
person and bag (R. 24). The trial court denied the motion, and 
appellant was subsequently convicted after a bench trial (R. 
130). Thereafter, the court sentenced appellant an indefinite 
term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. The said 
sentence was suspended in lieu of thirty-six (36) months 
probation under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 
142). 
On appeal, this Court reversed appellant's conviction, 
on the ground that he had been unlawfully seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, and that his consents were not sufficiently 
attenuated to dissipate the effects of the unlawful seizure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts in the instant case 
is included in the Brief of Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State has failed to demonstrate that this Court 
committed any factual or legal error in deciding that the 
searched conducted on appellant's person and bag were 
constitutionally inform where he had been unreasonably detained 
and his consents obtained in close proximity to the illegal 
See State v. Carter, No. 900303-CA (Utah Ct.App. March 20, 
1991) at pp. 10-11, 17. A copy of the opinion is attached hereto 
in the addendum. 
-2-
de t en t I on . T h u s , L n e Ins t ant pe t i 11 < )i i f < >:i r ehear I ng i s me r i 1 1 ess 
and must be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The trial court in th< instant case expressly found 
that appellant had been unlawfully del lined prioi tn t h M t nna of 
tin p.if (lnvn s e a n h he'aa-a M U M i» Uii no leni-aaial le s i s p n i n to 
2 b e l i e v e thai he Wu,\ engaged in i l l w i1 di IKJ trail l c k m q . The 
State did n it and tide not ex p l i c i t ! ) challenged the trial court's 
findtnq that Mia i rn I laJ deteatjiui ua> ani e a s o n d b 1 e and therefore 
illegal. -* It La;.
 ( l.owevt i , attempted to collaterally :hallenge 
the findings by tne cursory argument in its R e s p o n s e Brief ana 
>~ - • 'tl l e r e - . . • : , . : ^ . . •- ' ^ ^ 
•r j ; -
 ( . . • before [app-j; . + as^n:« : * 
.. 4 
-.*-' : • : oi r person unU way."' Tacit diyuuifc 
See C a r t e r , at 1 0 - 1 1 . Ir i f a c t , the trial court s p e c i f i c a l l y 
found that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to detain 
appellant even after he failed to p r o d u c e an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . !5ee 
Id. at 10. 
3 
See jail, at ] 1 . 
4 
See Brief of Appellee, at 23; Petition for Rehearing, at 5 and 
n. 2. The State itself recognizes the consequence of a party's 
failure to challenge a trial court's specific findings of fact: 
in the absence of a direct challenge, the party is presumed to 
have accepted the correctness of those findings. See Brief of 
Appellant at 15; see also Carter, at 11 (concluding that 
appellant w as unreasonably seized because "the State does not 
challenge the trial judge's findings or conclusions as to 
reasonable suspicion"). 
3 
of this Court's and the court below1 s conclusion that the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize or detain appellant 
5 in the first instance. Thus, ff[f]or the purposes of legal 
analysis, . . . this Court must rely on the correctness of the 
[trial court's] findings of fact" and should not allow the State 
to re-litigate the issue of prior police misconduct. 
Appellant submits that the State erred in petitioning 
this Court for rehearing. The error stems apparently from its 
entire misreading of the holding in State v. Carter. If this 
Court agrees with appellant and disposes of the State's 
collateral argument that there was no prior police illegality in 
the instant case, then the error in the petition for rehearing 
becomes manifest and the issue raised relatively easy to resolve. 
As this Court correctly noted, the three-part issue on 
appeal is "[1] whether there was a reasonable suspicion to detain 
defendant and [2] whether his subsequent consents to search were 
both voluntary and [3] sufficiently attenuated from any prior 
7 illegality to justify the searches." Having found that the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain appellant, the 
trial court went directly on to conduct "the [unnecessary 
See Carter, at 17 and no. 2. 
See Brief of Appellant at 15. 
Carter, at 4. 
-4-
inquiry" of appellant's consent to the searches. It failed, 
however, to inquire whether or when exactly appellant was seized 
and whether the consents were sufficiently attenuated from the 
unreasonable or illegal police detention as to dissipate the 
9 
effects of that misconduct. 
In the petition for rehearing, the State seems to 
focus, albeit erroneously, on this Court's determination of the 
point when appellant was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment as the holding or the "critical conclusion" in the 
opinion. However, the State seems to ignore that this Court 
found not only a seizure, but also that appellant was 
"unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment." 
This Court's statement concerning when appellant might 
12 . 
actually have been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is not 
the "critical conclusion" in the opinion as suggested by the 
State. That statement was merely a preliminary finding directed 
obviously and solely to the question of whether appellant was 
See Carter, at 9. 
9 
See id., at 8. 
See Petition for Rehearing at 3. 
Carter, at 11 (emphasis added). 
12 
"We conclude that defendant was seized for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment at least at the point where Fullmer conducted a 
pat-down search." Carter, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
-5-
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. This Court apparently made 
that preliminary finding because the State has consistently 
maintained that the encounter between appellant and the officers 
13 
never escalated into a Fourth Amendment seizure. Furthermore, 
the Court's emphasis on the word "at least" does not suggest that 
the pat-down marked the precise point when appellant was 
constitutionally seized. It merely reiterated the trial court's 
findings that the officers had no articulable suspicion to detain 
14 
appellant prior to the pat-down. 
The critical conclusion reached by this Court is that 
there could not have been a constitutionally sound consensual 
search where appellant had been unreasonably detained and his 
consents were not sufficiently attenuated to purge the prior 
police illegality (i.e., the unreasonable detention which the 
State either analytically overlooks or is attempting to 
relitigate). In articulating that conclusion, this Court 
stated: 
The undisputed facts in the record establish 
that the consensual search which resulted in 
the ultimate discovery of the drugs occurred 
after an illegal detention. [Appellant] 
raised his shirt displaying the tape around 
his middle at a time both the trial court and 
13 
See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, at 12. 
1 4
 See Carter, at 10. 
15 
See also text accompanying supra note 5. 
-6-
this court have concluded the officers did 
not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. 
There were no Miranda warnings, or other 
intervening circumstances documents in the 
record between the time of his illegal 
seizure and the ultimate discovery of the 
contraband. On the uncontroverted fats in 
the record before us, we conclude that 
[appellant]'s consent was tainted by the 
prior illegal seizure as a matter of law and, 
therefore, that ..the contraband should have 
been suppressed. 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate only when the 
17 Court has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. 
The State has not pointed to any facts in the record that this 
Court overlooked or misapprehended. In fact, it is the State 
that misapprehended the facts and the law in the instant case by 
arguing that appellant "voluntarily consented to both searches" 
"prior to the officers' search of [his] bag and person (i.e., 
prior to the point when the 'seizure' occurred, according to this 
18 Court's determination)." The record adequately supports the 
Court's factual conclusion that the consents were obtained 
19 
subsequent to an illegal police detention. Thus, the 
consents, having been obtained via police exploitation of the 
Carter, at 17-18 (emphasis added and footnote ommitted). 
17 
See Utah R.App.P. 35(a); Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
129 P. 619, 624 (1913). 
18 
Petition for Rehearing at 3. 
19 
See Carter, at 10 (citing Trial Court's findings) and at 17 
and n. 9. 
-7-
prior illegality, could not, as a matter of law, support the 
20 
searches conducted on appellant. 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, where the 
State has shown no factual or legal error on the part of the 
Court, this Court should summarily dismiss the petition for 
rehearing for lack of merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
summarily dismiss the State's petition for rehearing and reaffirm 
its decision of March 20, 1991, reversing the trial court's 
denial of appellant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Petition for Hearing was mailed/delivered 
to Judith S.H. Atherton, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this day 
of May, 1991. 
u
 Sjee State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah, 1990); State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
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ADDENDUM 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rodney Donald Carter, 
Defendant and Appellant-. 
MAR 20 mi 
foty T Nbenffi* 
Qerk of the Co,<:;* 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900303-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 20 , 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Attorneys: Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Rodney Donald Carter appeals his conviction of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(IV) (1990). Defendant filed a pretrial motion to 
suppress cocaine seized from his person, claiming narcotics 
agents had violated his rights under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion and 
defendant was convicted following a bench trial. We reverse. 
Because the legal issues surrounding the seizure of 
contraband are highly fact sensitive, we recite the facts in 
detail. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). On July 17, 1989, at 
approximately 5:15 p.m., Detective Bart Palmer (Palmer) of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office and Lieutenant Dave Fullmer 
(Fullmer) of the Utah State Narcotics Agency, dressed in street 
clothes, were observing passengers deplaning from an America 
West flight arriving from Los Angeles via Las Vegas, in an 
effort to locate drug couriers. The officers noticed defendant 
as he carried a duffel bag and scanned the area but did not 
appear to be looking for anyone in particular or reading signs 
for directions. As defendant walked up the concourse, he looked 
back in the direction of the officers three times. The officers 
continued to observe defendant, losing visual contact briefly, 
but then noticing him enter a bank of pay telephones. Palmer 
entered the cubicle next to defendant, but was unable to hear 
defendant speak during the short time defendant was in the 
telephone area. 
After hanging up the telephone, defendant walked to the 
escalator and then quickened his pace, walking past other 
people, as he rode down to the main level of the airport. 
Maintaining his fast pace, defendant exited the terminal and 
went to the cab stand just outside the main .doors. While 
Fullmer exited through another set of doors, Palmer followed 
defendant and approached defendant after he had placed his bag 
in a taxi and was about to enter the taxi. 
Palmer identified himself as a police officer and asked if 
defendant would talk with him. Defendant agreed and removed his 
bag from the taxi. Palmer and defendant moved to a public area 
outside the airport terminal about twenty feet from where the 
taxi had been parked. Palmer then asked to see defendant's 
airplane ticket and defendant indicated he thought he had left 
it on the airplane, but produced his recent ticket from Salt 
Lake to Las Vegas for Palmer to examine. Palmer examined the 
ticket and returned it. 
Fullmer arrived near the scene as Palmer was asking 
defendant for identification. Defendant indicated he did not 
have any, but proceeded to look in his bag for identification 
pursuant to Palmer's request. As he bent over to look in his 
bag, Fullmer noticed a line protruding through defendant's 
shirt. Palmer then indicated he was a narcotics officer and 
asked defendant if he could search his bag. Defendant agreed. 
As Palmer began searching defendant's bag, Fullmer asked 
defendant if he could search his person. Defendant responded 
"go ahead" and turned his back to Fullmer. 
During a pat-down search, Fullmer detected two bulges in 
defendant's lower abdominal area and asked what they were. 
Defendant did not answer. Fullmer asked if he could see the 
bulges &nc3 again defendant did not respond verbally, "but this 
time he^  lifted his shirt revealing masking tape around his 
midsection going down into his pants. When asked the purpose of 
the tape, defendant indicated he had injured his ribs. 
The tape was below defendant's ribs starting near his 
waistline and continuing into his pants. Fullmer testified he 
then asked defendant if he could see the rest of the tape, and 
defendant responded that he could, but stated he would rather 
not do so in the public area of the terminal. Fullmer suggested 
going to the airport office just inside the doors. Defendant 
agreed and the three proceeded inside. 
Once in the airport office, defendant refused an invitation 
to sit and told the officers "you're got me, you might as well 
have this," revealing the packages on his lower abdomen which 
contained cocaine. Defendant was then arrested. 
Defendant claims his rights under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the fourth and fourteenth amendments 
of the United States Constitution were violated. Defendant 
argues the police did not have a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to detain him and that he did not voluntarily consent 
to the search of his person.1 
Initially, the state responds that the exchange between the 
officers and defendant was a constitutionally permissible 
voluntary encounter. The state continues that when the 
encounter advanced to the point where defendant did not feel 
1. Although defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution provides greater protection from unlawful 
search and seizure than the fourth amendment, he does not offer 
a specific analysis, but merely cites State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460 (Utah 1990), for the conclusory proposition that Utah has 
abandoned "tailgating" Supreme Court cases. While Larocco did 
diverge from previously identical state and federal search and 
seizure analyses in Utah, it did so specifically in the area of 
automobiles. Defendant offers no rationale as to why our 
analysis of the issues in the instant case should likewise 
diverge from the federal analysis. Where a defendant fails to 
support his state constitutional argument with analysis or legal 
authority, this court will not address it. State v. Marshall, 
791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, we do not engage in an 
independent state constitutional analysis under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
free to leave, at this point the trial court found reasonable 
suspicion to believe he was involved in transporting drugs, and 
that all searches were pursuant to defendant's voluntary 
consent. In order to resolve the legal issues presented in this 
appeal, we deal with whether there was reasonable suspicion to 
detain defendant and whether his subsequent consents to search 
were both voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from any prior 
illegality to justify the searches. 
NATURE OF POLICE ENCOUNTER 
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized three levels of police-citizen 
encounters and the circumstances under which they are 
constitutionally permissible. 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime and pose questions so long- as 
the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person 
if the officer has an "articulable 
suspicion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop; (3) 
an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
Ifl. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also State v. Jackson. 149 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 64, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Smith 781 P.2d 879, 
881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 
The first level of encounter, a "level one" encounter, 
encompasses situations where an officer approaches an 
individual and poses questions to the individual, so long as 
the individual is not detained against his will. This court 
recently stated " [a]s long as the person 'remains free to 
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no 
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under 
the Constitution require some particularized and objective 
justification. • - Jackson. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66 (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
In State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(citing Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 544), we noted that "when a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's 
investigation,, but because he believes he is not free to leave, 
a seizure occurs." See also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 
(Utah Ct. App, 1§89) ,(quoting Truiillo. 739 P.2d at 87). In 
other words, a seizure occurs where an officer by show of 
authority or physical force in some way restricts the liberty 
of an individual, Truiillo* 739 P.2d at 87 (citing Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 553),, 
Generally, a seizure does not occur where an officer 
simply approaches an individual in public, asks questions, and 
even requests identification. See, e.q., Deitman, 739 P.2d at 
618; Jackson. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66; Truiillo. 739 P.2d at 
88. Standing alone, the fact that an officer identifies 
himself as a police officer does not convert a consensual 
encounter into a seizure. See Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 
497 (1983). 
This court has recognized circumstances that, when 
considered in light of all other circumstances, tend to 
indicate a seizure has occurred: (1) the presence of several 
uniformed officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; 
(3) physical touching of the individual; and (4) the use of 
language or voice tone threatening to the individual. Jackson, 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). 
Other courts have looked to additional factors in 
evaluating the nature of an encounter. These factors include 
the length of an interview, blocking an individual's path, 
retaining an individual's travel ticket, the removal of the 
defendant to a private area, statements by police that an 
investigation has focused on the individual, or searching the 
defendant's belongings or person. See United States v. 
Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1988), overruled on 
other grounds, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Utah cases are not dispositive on the issue of what 
constitutes a seizure for fourth amendment purposes in the 
context of an airport stop. We therefore review a number of 
insightful federal cases which have treated this topic. In 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), a plurality of the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the determination of the 
state appellate court that defendant was not free to leave 
where he was "confined" in a small area at an airport with two 
undercover narcotics agents who had indicated defendant was 
suspected of transporting narcotics. In upholding the trial 
court's decision, the Court cautioned that because 
circumstances could vary endlessly, there was no "litmus paper" 
test for distinguishing airport consensual encounters from 
seizures,
 v*Id. at 506. 
In Gonzales, the fifth circuit was faced with a situation 
involving a defendant stopped in an airport by two undercover 
narcotics agents who identified themselves as such and asked to 
look in the gym bag defendant was carrying. The court 
concluded that although the encounter was initially a voluntary 
encounter, it escalated into a seizure when the officer 
informed defendant he was "working narcotics" and asked to look 
in her bag. The court reasoned that at that time "a reasonable 
person would no longer have felt free to leave." 842 F.2d at 
752.2 
Again in United States v> S9lberth, 846 F.2d 983 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 865 (1988), the fifth circuit 
addressed a situation where a defendant was stopped by 
undercover narcotics officers at an airport. The court noted 
that the initial encounter with defendant was permissible where 
the stop was non-coercive, and defendant's identification and 
ticket were returned to her shortly after they were examined by 
the officers. The court further concluded that a consensual 
search of defendant's handbag did not convert the encounter 
into a fourth amendment seizure where the interview was 
conducted in public, no coercion was involved, and the officers 
did nothing to lead defendant to believe she was not free to 
leave. The court did note, however, that when the officers 
then requested that the defendant submit to a pat-down search, 
a seizure occurred requiring reasonable suspicion. See id. at 
990 n.ll. 
2. On similar facts, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District" of Columbia, applying the objective "free to 
leave" standard, concluded a defendant was not seized for 
fourth amendment purposes where an undercover narcotics officer 
stationed at a transportation center identified himself as 
such, asked for and returned identification and tickets, and 
then asked to search defendant's bags. See United States v. 
Smiill/ 901 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 
ill S.Ct. 172 (1990); £££. also United States v. Maraoh. 894 
F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 
214 (1990). (Footnote 2 continued on page 7) 
In United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1987), 
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988), the court concluded no 
seizure occurred where two undercover narcotics agents stopped 
a deplaning passenger, identified themselves, requested 
defendant's identification, and suggested moving to a quieter 
location. The court concluded, however, that the encounter 
escalated into a seizure when the officers stated t'hey 
suspected defendant of carrying drugs and read defendant her 
Miranda rights, because at that point a reasonable person would 
not have felt free to leave. 
In the instant case, two narcotics officers dressed in 
plain clothes approached defendant while he was getting into a 
taxi and asked to speak to him. They directed him to a 
location about twenty feet from the taxi area. The record does 
not reflect that the officers carried any visible weapons or 
acted in an intimidating manner. Palmer, the officer who 
initially approached defendant, asked defendantmfor his ticket 
and identification, and after receiving a ticket returned it. 
Palmer then identified himself as a narcotics officer and asked 
to look in defendant's bag. Immediately after defendant agreed 
to allow Palmer to search his bag, Fullmer asked defendant if 
he could search defendant's person, and after defendant agreed, 
conducted a pat-down search of his person. 
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine 
obtained in the search of defendant's person, the trial judge 
carefully articulated exactly when he found the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was engaged in 
criminal conduct, but the judge did not address the precise 
issue of whether or when the encounter progressed to a level 
twcT seizure. Thus, we^have no determination to review.3 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
Recently, another court that had previously adopted the 
Maraoh approach held that a defendant was seized, as a 
reasonable man would not have felt free to leave where he had 
been approached at a train station by narcotics agents who 
questioned him, asked to search his bag, allowed him to leave, 
and then stopped him about fifteen minutes later and asked to 
do a body search of defendant and his companion. £££ Guadalupe 
v. United States, No. 89-793 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1991). 
3. The parties do not refer us to, nor were we able to locate 
any prior Utah authority defining the precise standard to be 
Instead, the judge focused on the issue of defendant's consents 
to search and whether defendant's consents were voluntary.4 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
employed in appellate review of a trial court's determination 
of when a seizure occurs. Although we need not apply a 
standard of review in this case because of the trial court's 
failure to address the specific issue of when a seizure 
occurred, we note that a trial court's ultimate determination 
of whether on particular facts an encounter amounts to a 
seizure under the fourth amendment has been held to be a legal 
conclusion and thus afforded no deference on appeal, but 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. See United 
States v. Maraoh. 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert-
denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990) ("It does not matter 
that Mendenhall requires the courts to consider whether a 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave 'in view of all 
the circumstances surrounding the incident.' Although 
Mendenhall's seizure test 'is necessarily imprecise' and 
'flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police 
conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for 
consistent application from one police encounter to the next, 
regardless of the particular individual's response to the 
actions of the police.' E>£ novo review helps to ensure 
•consistent application.'") (citations omitted). 
We find this approach analytically sound. Although the 
factual circumstances articulated in findings which lead to the 
ultimate determination that a seizure has occurred should be 
afforded great deference, treating the determination that a 
seizure has occurred as a factual finding would result in trial 
judges merely making one finding—"the defendant was seized." 
We note, however, that we see no analytical distinction 
among a trial court's determinations of when a seizure occurs, 
of reasonable suspicion, or of voluntary consent for purposes 
of the applicable standard of review. Thus, one could argue 
that since prior Utah authority, as well as substantial 
authority from other state and federal jurisdictions, has 
treated reasonable suspicion and voluntary consent as factual 
determinations to be reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard, we must adopt that standard to review a determination 
of if or when a seizure occurred. See infra notes 6 & 8. 
4. The trial court found "defendant freely and voluntarily 
consented to the police requests at least through the point of 
his voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing to the police 
the masking tape that was bound around his body." We 
Although the judge found defendant voluntarily consented 
to both the search of his bag and his person, this was not the 
necessary inquiry. Indeed, it is easy to conceive a situation 
where an individual involved in an encounter with the police 
would not feel free to leave but nevertheless would voluntarily 
consent to a search during his seizure. While the tests for 
evaluating the voluntariness of consent to search and the 
nature of an encounter are similar and may overlap, they are 
not identical and merit separate consideration. See United 
States v. Maraoh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert, 
denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990). 
In light of the authority we have reviewed, and based upon 
the factual record before us, we believe a reasonable person 
would not have felt free to leave at the point where he had 
been stopped and detained by two men who identified themselves 
as narcotics officers and one officer searched his person while 
the other was already simultaneously searching his belongings. 
We therefore conclude that defendant was seized for purposes of 
the fourth amendment at least at the point where Fullmer 
conducted a pat-down search of defendant. See State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Our inquiry does not end with our conclusion that 
defendant's encounter with the officers escalated into a 
seizure or a level two stop. We must now determine whether 
defendant's temporary detention was justified, that is, whether 
it was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
believe he was engaged in criminal activity. See State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (M[i]n order to 
justify this seizure, Officer [] must point to specific, 
articulable facts which, together with rational inferences 
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime."); see also Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). 
(Footnote 4 continued) 
understand this determination to be directed to defendant's 
several consents to search rather than to the issue of 
seizure. However, even if we were to stretch to translate this 
as a determination that the defendant remained throughout the 
encounter "in the spirit of cooperation with the officers' 
investigation,- not because of the officers' "show of 
authority," we would find the determination error under either 
a correction of error or a clearly erroneous standard. 
In the instant case, the trial judge expressly stated that 
there was no reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was 
transporting narcotics at the time the officers conducted a 
pat-down search of his person. Specifically, the trial judge 
states: 
1. The Court specifically discredits the 
officers ability to form a reasonable 
articulate suspicion prior to the time of 
the defendant's failure to provide an 
identification upon request. 
2. The Court concludes that the absence 
or the failure of the defendant to produce 
identification also was not by itself, or 
in the aggregate with the previously 
listed factors, sufficient to indicate a 
reasonable articulable suspicion. 
3. The Court further concludes that the 
officer's perception of a line just at or 
above the defendant's waist, but under his 
outer clothing, was not a reasonable 
articulable suspicion by itself or in 
combination with anything previously 
noted.5 
4. The Court further concludes that the 
pat down search and observations made by 
5. This conclusion does not specifically deal with the 
officer's testimony that he had "on numerous occasions over 
[his] fourteen years in this business seen narcotics taped to 
people's midsections and back and sides," and thus his 
expressed concern that the line "might" be tape securing 
narcotics. Although the officer's testimony is certainly 
relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion, the 
officer also testified he "definitely didn't know exactly what 
[the line] was," and it could just as likely have been "shorts 
or something else." The trial court was able to observe the 
demeanor of the officer testifying and could have properly 
determined that his preliminary suspicions were still more in 
the nature of a "hunch" and had not risen to the requisite 
level of reasonable suspicion. This probably explains why the 
state does not challenge this determination on appeal and is 
why we find no error in it either. 
the officers, including the feeling of the 
bulge, at that time was not sufficient to 
constitute a reasonable suspicion either 
alone or in the aggregate. 
On appeal, the state does not challenge the trial judge's 
findings or conclusions as to reasonable suspicion, and we find 
no error in them.6 Accordingly, we conclude defendant was 
unreasonably seized in violation of the fourth amendment. 
6. Because the state has not challenged the trial judge's 
determinations as to reasonable suspicion, we have not focused 
on the appropriate standard of review we should apply in 
reviewing them. The trial judge labeled his determinations on 
reasonable suspicion as "conclusions of law." Generally, we 
review conclusions of law under a correction of error 
standard. See State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) . 
Again, however, we are puzzled by what standard of review 
we should apply in reviewing a trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion. The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
treated a determination of reasonable suspicion as a factual 
finding, indicating that determinations of reasonable suspicion 
are properly reviewed by appellate courts under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1987) ("In determining whether the facts support a 
reasonable suspicion . . . , a trial court must consider the 
totality of the circumstances facing the officers. The 
reviewing court should not overturn the trial court's 
determination unless it is clearly erroneous.") (citations 
omitted). This court has followed the supreme court's 
directive and has applied the clearly erroneous standard in 
comparable situations. See, e.g., State v. Grovier, No. 
900329-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah Ct. App. March 7, 1991) 
(applying clearly erroneous standard to review determination 
that reasonable suspicion existed); State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (whether reasonable suspicion 
existed to justify an investigatory detention presents a 
question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(whether seizure supported by reasonable suspicion reviewed 
under clearly erroneous standard). 
Analytically, however, we are inclined to agree with the 
trial court that a determination of reasonable suspicion more 
logically falls into the conclusion of law category. See 5UPE9 
note 3 and infra note 8; see also Haves v. State. 785 P.2d 33, 
36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion is mixed 
question, factual findings upheld unless clearly erroneous, but 
ultimate conclusion is subject to &£. novo review). 
CONSENT 
Nevertheless, we continue our inquiry as the state 
contends defendant's voluntary consent purged any prior 
violation of his fourth amendment rights. Although a 
warrantless search is generally violative of the fourth 
amendment, it is well settled that "one of the specifically 
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant 
and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); 
£££ State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied/ No. 
900238 (Utah Oct. 23, 1990).-
In determining whether a consent to search is lawfully 
obtained following a fourth amendment violation, a two prong 
test must be met for the evidence to be admissible: " (1) the 
consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not 
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688). The state carries the burden 
of proving both prongs of the test. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 222; Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 687; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A. voluntariness 
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive issue to be 
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. See 
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887; Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (citing United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980)). This includes 
the specific characteristics of the accused and the details of 
the police conduct involved. Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689. 
In Marshall. this court set forth the standard previously 
adopted by the tenth circuit for determining whether the 
government had sustained its burden of proving voluntary 
consent. 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott, 5.46 F.2d 
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)); Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. ' 
The Utah Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to 
what factors may indicate a lack of coercion, including: Ml) 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) 
the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a 
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner . . .; and 
5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer.w State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980). It is also noteworthy that the government is not 
required to prove the defendant knew of his right to refuse 
consent in order to prove voluntariness. I&; see also 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (not required to .prove knowledge 
of right to refuse, but a factor to consider in evaluating 
voluntariness) . 
Defendant initially claims that his consent to the search 
of his body was not voluntary because he was in the presence of 
7. The state claims the burden of proof needed to establish 
voluntary consent is only a preponderance of the evidence. See 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) 
(reviewing voluntariness of consent to warrantless search 
"controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should 
impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence"); United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 
1990) (rejecting previous clear and convincing standard and 
adopting preponderance standard when examining voluntariness of 
consent to search); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (using preponderance standard); People v. Harris, 
199 111. App, 3d 1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277 (1990); State v. Cress, 
576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 
1990) . 
We agree with the state that this court has not precisely 
dealt with the issue of the proper burden of proof required to 
prove voluntary consent. The use of the general standard from 
Abbott in Marshall and Webb was not directed to the burden of 
proof issue. The burden of proof to prove voluntary consent 
was not directly at issue in either case. Furthermore, we do 
not find it necessary to decide the burden of proof issue today 
as the evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the searches which led to 
the discovery of the cocaine under either a preponderance or a 
clear and convincing standard. 
two plain clothes officers and was not informed of his right 
not to consent. He cites no authority for this proposition. 
The trial judge found that "the defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to the police requests at least through 
the point of his voluntarily raising his shirt.H Defendant has 
failed to direct us to any facts in the record contrary to this 
determination. There is nothing in. the record to indicate 
overreaching or coercion by the officers in obtaining 
defendant's consent to lift his shirt which resulted in the 
discovery of the taped packages around his waist and their 
ultimate removal. There is substantial support in the record 
for the trial court's determination that defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to the searches which occurred.8 
8. We need not decide the precise standard to apply in 
reviewing the trial court's determination of voluntary consent 
because we find the determination correct under either a 
correction of error standard, commonly utilized when reviewing 
legal conclusions, or a clearly erroneous standard, as commonly 
used when reviewing factual findings. However, we are 
concerned about the mixed signals this court has given when 
dealing with the issue of what the appropriate standard of 
review is to review a determination of voluntary consent. 
Prior cases from the Utah Supreme Court have seemed to 
treat a finding of voluntary consent as a factual finding. 
£££, e.g., State v, Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (finding 
of fact not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous, but here 
"trial court's finding of consent [was] clearly erroneous"); 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (applying 
totality of circumstances test to evaluate consent). This is 
consistent with authority from other state and federal 
jurisdictions. &££, e,q., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 249 (1973) ("Voluntariness [of consent] is a question of 
fact to be determined from all the circumstances . . . . " ) ; 
United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 387 (D.C. Cir) (trial 
court's "conclusion" that defendant voluntarily consented 
subject to clearly erroneous standard), cert. denied, 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1831 (1990); United States v. Galberth, 846 
F.2d 983, 987-88 (5th Cir.) (determination of voluntary consent 
subjected to clearly erroneous standard), cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 865 (1988); United States v. Borys. 766 F.2d 304, 314-15 
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying clearly erroneous standard), cert, 
denied. 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Esoinosa, 787 
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Recalde. 761 
F.2d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying clearly erroneous 
standard); People v. Carlson. 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984) 
(voluntariness is a question of fact); State v. Ruden, 245 Kan. 
B. Taint of Illegal Detention 
Defendant nevertheless argues that his consent was invalid 
as, even if it was voluntary, it was the product of an illegal 
(Footnote 8 continued) 
95, 774 P.2d 972, 979 (1989) (voluntariness is question of fact 
to be reviewed under clearly erroneous standard); State v. 
Flowers, 57 Wash. App. 636, 789 P.2d 333 (whether consent was 
freely given is a factual question), review denied, 115 Wash.2d 
1009, 797 P.2d 511 (1990); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1358 
(Wyo. 1990) (voluntariness is question of fact). 
Until recently, this court had also followed a similar 
approach. See, e.g. . State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("question of whether consent to a search 
was in fact •voluntary* . . . is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of all the circumstances"), cert. 
denied. No. 900238 (Utah Oct. 23, 1990); State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (voluntariness of consent is a 
question of fact to be disturbed -only if the appellant 
demonstrates there has been clear error*). 
Recently, however, a panel of this court adopted a 
two-prong analysis for reviewing voluntary consent to search in 
State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme). In Bobo, the panel set 
out a two-part standard to employ when reviewing a trial 
court's determination of voluntary consent. "[T]he factual 
findings leading to the trial court's determination that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his home are 
considered for clear error and the legal conclusion of 
voluntary consent premised upon those facts is examined for 
correctness." See ifl. (citing Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 
659 (Utah 1988)). This approach was followed in State v. 
Haroraves, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood). 
Subsequently, however, this court has returned to 
reviewing a determination of voluntary consent under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Grovier, No. 
900329-CA, slip op. at 7 & n.l (Utah Ct. App. March 7, 1991) 
(Judges Bench, Jackson, and Russon) (expressly rejecting the 
Bobo approach and reviewing voluntary consent to search as only 
a question of fact); State v. Steroer, No. 900078-CA, slip op. 
at 7, n.5 (Utah Ct. App. March 6, 1991) (Judges Bench, Jackson 
and Russon). Since several of the judges concurring in Bobo 
and Haroraves have since returned to the clearly erroneous 
standard, it may be that they, like the author, have only 
recently focused on the issue. (Footnote 8 continued on page 
16) 
stop and detention. Even where the government proves the 
consent is voluntary, such consent cannot justify a search if 
(Footnote 8 continued) 
Although the great weight of authority supports treating a 
determination of voluntary consent as a factual finding, we 
find the bifurcated approach articulated in Bobo analytically 
sound. It has also been adopted by at least one other state 
appellate court. Borqen v. State, 58 Md. App. 61/ 472 A.2d 
114, 123 (viewing issue of voluntary consent "we give great 
weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, 
first-level facts (such as • the time that an interrogation 
began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a 
telephone call was requested) [but] make our own independent 
judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making 
that independent judgment resolve for ourselves the ultimate 
second-level fact — the existence or non-existence of 
voluntariness.M), cert. denied, 300 Md. App. 483, 479 A.2d 372 
(1984). This two step analysis is consistent with our prior 
directives to trial courts to make detailed basic factual 
findings rather than conclusory statements. See State v. 
Lovearen, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (UtahCt. App. 1990) 
(detailed findings necessary to facilitate meaningful appellate 
review); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
It seems to defeat the purpose of appellate review if a trial 
court is permitted to make only one ultimate factual 
••finding" — "the defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search." Yet, we do acknowledge that the issue of voluntary 
consent is extremely fact sensitive and trial judges may 
arguably be in the best position to determine voluntary consent 
after hearing all the evidence. A trial judge may not be able 
to articulate exactly what prompted the determination that one 
consent was voluntary while another was coerced, but the judge 
knows or senses the difference after hearing first-hand the 
testimony offered and perceiving the nuances and subtleties of 
that testimony. There may be sound policy reasons to ignore 
the more analytically precise approach advocated by Bobo and to 
simply defer to the trial court even though technically a 
determination of voluntary consent is more akin to a legal 
conclusion. 
In sum, we believe that the standard of review to be 
applied when reviewing a trial court's determination of 
voluntary consent, reasonable suspicion, or when a seizure 
occurs should be definitively determined by the Utah Supreme 
Court in order to put to rest the conflicts between panels of 
this court and alleviate the confusing state of the law on 
these continually recurring issues. 
the consent was obtained through the exploitation of an 
antecedent police illegality. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 690-91. 
Thus, if an antecedent police illegality exists, the government 
must establish that the otherwise voluntary consent is 
sufficiently attenuated to have purged the taint of the 
original police illegality. Id. 
In Arroyo, the supreme court recognized several factors 
that merit consideration when determining if consent was 
obtained as a result of an exploitation of a prior illegality. 
These factors include Miranda warnings, temporal proximity of 
the illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the flagrancy of the illegality. See id. at 
690-91 & n.4. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 
and 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 
1987)); see also State v. Sims, No. 890463-CA, slip op. (Utah 
Ct. App. March 15, 1991). 
In the instant case, the trial judge ruled on defendant's 
motion to suppress prior to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption 
of the "exploitation of the prior illegality" analysis for 
evaluating consent to search in Arroyo. Under then existing 
Utah case law, no such independent exploration was required. 
See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
overruled, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Thus, neither counsel nor 
the trial judge had the benefit of the supreme court's 
analysis. Therefore, the trial judge did not address the issue 
of whether defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from 
what we have determined on appeal to be an illegal detention. 
The undisputed facts in the record establish that the 
consensual search which resulted in the ultimate discovery of 
the drugs occurred after an illegal detention.9 Defendant 
raised his shirt displaying the tape around his middle at a 
time both the trial court and this court have concluded the 
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. 
There were no Miranda warnings, or other intervening 
circumstances documented in the record between the time of his 
illegal seizure and the ultimate discovery of the contraband. 
9. The trial judge concluded there was reasonable suspicion to 
support defendant's detention after he lifted his shirt, 
displaying the tape, and his explanation for the tape was 
illogical. However, defendant had previously been seized 
without supporting reasonable suspicion during the pat-down 
search prior to the lifting of his shirt. 
On the uncontroverted facts in the record before us, we 
conclude that defendant's consent was tainted by the prior 
illegal seizure as a matter of law and, therefore, that the 
contraband should have been suppressed. 
although defendant's initial 
level one, 
to a level two 
was 
further 
officers 
In sum, we conclude that 
encounter with the narcotics officers was a 
voluntary or consensual encounter, it escalated 
seizure at least at the point Fullmer physically searched 
defendant by conducting a pat-down search while Palmer 
simultaneously searching defendant's belongings. We 
uphold the determination of the trial judge that the 
did not have reasonable suspicion to suspect defendant was 
illicit drugs at the time he was seized. Such a 
of reasonable suspicion amounts 
fourth amendment right to be free 
seizure. This constitutional 
cured by defendant's voluntary 
exposed the contraband. We find 
exposed the contraband, although 
on the facts in the record, were 
be purged of the effect of the 
transporting 
level two stop in the absence 
to a violation of defendant's 
from unreasonable search and 
violation is not necessarily 
consent to the searches which 
the subsequent searches which 
pursuant to voluntary consent, 
not sufficiently attenuated to 
prior illegal seizure. 
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